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This paper estimates the effect of domestic and foreign privatization on multifactor 
productivity (MFP) using long panel data for nearly the universe of initially state-owned 
manufacturing firms in Ukraine.  The longitudinal dimension of the data is used to measure and 
control for pre-privatization selection bias and to estimate long-run impacts.  The data imply 
steadily increasing MFP as a result of domestic privatization, reaching about 25 percent relative 
to state-owned firms after six years.  Until recently, Ukraine has had relatively few cases of 
privatization to foreign investors, and estimates of the MFP impact are more sensitive to controls 
for selection bias, but the results suggest foreign privatization produces a productivity advantage 
of about 40 percent in 2004–2005. 
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1.  Introduction 
This paper estimates the effects of privatization on multifactor productivity of 
manufacturing firms in Ukraine, updating the analysis of Brown et al. (2006).  While the original 
analysis relied on data starting in 1989 and running only through 2002, this paper adds three 
recent years:  2003–2005.  Because many firms were privatized in the late 1990s, and indeed 
even in the early 2000s, the extra years provide a longer window to assess any privatization 
effects.  In addition, the original paper was forced to rely on crude indicators of ownership, 
particularly for foreign investor participation, while this paper uses greatly improved data on 
shareholdings by types of investors, including foreigners. 
The paper estimates the productivity-privatization relationship within industry-year cells 
to control for aggregate and sector-specific shocks as well as mismeasurement of deflators across 
industries.  The analysis permits differences in estimated production functions across industries 
to avoid biases associated with technology mismeasurement, and it takes into account selection 
bias associated not only with fixed differences among firms but also with differing trend 
productivity growth rates.  Either of these factors—level or trend differences— may affect the 
probability of privatization and whether the new owners are domestic or foreign investors.  The 
availability of several years of pre-privatization data is also useful for evaluating anticipatory 
effects and for comparing possible selection bias across specifications.  The several years of 
post-privatization data help shed light on how quickly any benefits from privatization are 
realized and whether they are sustained or tend to diminish over time.  The paper also 
distinguishes between the effects of different types of new private ownership structures—
domestic versus foreign— although the relatively small sample size for the latter limits the 
strength of the inferences that can be drawn. 
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 Section 2 describes the data and evolution of ownership.  Section 3 describes the 
estimation procedures, and Section 4 presents results.  Conclusions are summarized in Section 5. 
2.  Data  
The main data source is the national statistical office (Derzhkomstat in Ukrainian), which 
supplies annual industrial enterprise registries for 1989 and 1992–1998 and universal firm data 
for 1999–2005.  These data are supplemented by databases from the State Property Committee 
and the State Securities Commission.  The industrial registries are supposed to include all 
industrial firms with more than 100 employees plus those more than 25-percent owned by the 
state or by legal entities themselves included in the registry.  In fact, the practice seems to be that 
once firms enter the registries they continue to report even if the original conditions for inclusion 
are no longer satisfied.  The data may therefore be taken as corresponding to the “old” sector of 
firms (and their successors) inherited from the Soviet system.  Certainly with respect to this set 
of firms, the databases are quite comprehensive.  At the beginning of the transition process in 
1992, the firms in the industrial registry accounted for 94 percent of officially reported total 
industrial employment. 
The sample is restricted to manufacturing (NACE 15-36).  Recycling (NACE 37) is 
excluded because of noncomparability with OKONKh.  Only firms that are majority state-owned 
at first observation are included, while all non-profit organizations are excluded.  Firm-years are 
retained in the sample only when they contain complete information (nonmissing values for 
ownership, employment, output, and capital). 
The total number of firms ever in the regression sample is 7,050.  On average, each firm 
is observed about 9 years, and the total number of firm-year observations is 62,899. 
Summary statistics and definitions for the basic variables used to estimate productivity— 
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output, capital, and employment—are provided for selected years in Table 1.  Data on material 
costs are unfortunately not available for all years in the data; the specification of production 
technologies therefore assumes the only inputs are capital and labor.  Reflecting aggregate 
statistics, the data imply declining average employment, capital, and output, except for the most 
recent period since 1999.  These patterns for capital and output may reflect imperfect deflators 
that fail to distinguish true price and quantity changes; therefore, the econometric analysis 
handles this problem by controlling for a full set of industry-year interactions. 
 These data have been extensively cleaned to remove inconsistencies and to improve 
missing longitudinal linkages due to change of firm identifier from one year to the next 
(associated with reorganizations and changes of legal form, for instance).  The inconsistencies 
were evaluated using information from multiple sources (including not only separate data 
providers, but also previous year information available in the registries). The longitudinal 
linkages were improved using all available information, including industry, region, size, multiple 
sources for the same financial variables, and some exact linking variables (e.g., firm names and 
addresses) to match firms that exited the data in a given year with those that entered in the 
following year.  Although this issue has not received much attention in previous research, it is 
clear that accurate and complete links are crucial to any identification strategy such as ours that 
requires observations both before and after privatization.   For example, if firms that change their 
legal form are systematically different—engaging in greater restructuring, for example—then it 
is critical that they not be excluded from the analysis. 
 Turning to the ownership variables, a firm is defined as privately owned if a strict 
majority of shares is held in private hands.  The private ownership codes are constructed from 
State Property Committee private share information, while the foreign codes are constructed 
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from a State Stock Market and Securities Commission database on shareholdings and trading 
dates for shareholders with at least ten percent stakes in joint stock companies. 
The timing of the ownership variables has a bearing on the interpretation of the 
estimation results.  Ownership is measured as of the reporting date, the beginning of the calendar 
year.  The privatization year is thus defined as the year in which the ownership variable changes 
from state at the beginning of t-1 to private in t.  The actual transfer of shares could take place 
anytime during this year, and the transfer of effective control is even more ambiguous:  for 
instance, it could take place even before the shares are legally conveyed, if it is quite clear who 
the new owners will be, and it could take place significantly afterwards, if for example it takes 
time to call a general shareholders’ meeting to replace the board and management.  These 
ambiguities imply that the analysis should not be confined to comparisons of the immediate 
period just before and after the privatization year but instead take a longer perspective on both 
pre- and post-privatization performance.  Our data contain substantial numbers of firms with 
several observations before and after privatization, facilitating such an analysis.1 
Table 2 contains the mean values of the domestic and foreign ownership dummy 
variables, by year.  Ukraine’s earliest privatization experiences have some similarities to the 
“spontaneous” period in Hungary, as the central planning system dissolved at the end of the 
1980s and decision-making power devolved to managers and work collectives (Frydman et al., 
1993).  The provisions for leasing enterprise assets (with eventual buyout) represented the first 
organized transactions in 1990–1992, but the big impetus for most industrial enterprise 
                                                 
1 Of the total regression sample of 7,050 firms, 4,534 are privatized to domestic owners, 157 are privatized to 
foreign investors, and the rest are always state-owned during the observation period.  The mean number of 
observation years for domestic-privatized firms is 5.5 prior to their privatization and 5.6 subsequently; for foreign-
privatized firms, the mean numbers of observations are 9.2 pre- and 2.7 post-privatization, consistent with the later 
privatization to foreign investors shown in the table. 
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privatization was the mass privatization, somewhat similar to Russia’s, but at a delayed and 
slower pace, and the initial design provided even greater advantages to insiders acquiring shares 
in their companies (Frydman et al., 1993).  The initial consequence of privatization was large-
scale ownership by managers and workers, some blockholding by domestic entities, and 
continued state ownership.  Subsequently, blocks formed and foreigners made partial inroads. 
This approach to privatization method may affect the impact of the policy on firm 
productivity.  Case-by-case sales of large blocks of shares is usually considered the most 
effective method, and productivity effects of new foreign owners seem likely to be higher than 
those of domestic investors, as a result of better management skills and access to finance and 
new technologies. However, foreigners may face worse obstacles when layoff decisions are 
highly politicized and when local networks and knowledge of local conditions are 
nontransparent.  Transfers to employees and mass privatization, the more common methods in 
Ukraine, face disadvantages.  Employees may lack the necessary skills, capital, access to 
markets, and technologies necessary to turn their firms around, and corporate governance by 
employees may function particularly poorly when the firm requires difficult restructuring choices 
involving disparate distributional impacts within the firm.2  Mass and voucher privatization 
programs were intended to increase the speed of privatization by overcoming the problems of 
insufficient demand that are due to low domestic savings and reluctance of foreign investors, and 
if possible to jump-start domestic equity markets with a rapid release of shares.  But when 
combined with strong preferences for employees to use their vouchers in acquiring shares in their 
employer, as in Ukraine, with highly dispersed ownership structures, the results may be 
                                                 
2  Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994) and Lipton and Sachs (1990), for instance, argue against privatization to 
employees, while Ellerman (1993), Stiglitz (1999), and Weitzman (1993) argue in favor.  Earle and Estrin (1996) 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of worker and manager ownership in the transition setting. 
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unmonitored managerial control and—according to some—unfettered asset-stripping.3 
The effects of different privatization methods may also manifest themselves differently 
over time.   For example, if concentrated private ownership is necessary to achieve restructuring, 
then one would expect to see more immediate effects from sales to concentrated outsiders than 
from voucher or insider privatization, where it takes time for concentrated blocks to form.  The 
subsequent dynamics of the privatization effect may reflect secondary trading leading to 
increased concentration, however, and firms with high initial levels of inside and dispersed 
outside ownership may catch up so that the final impact after several years is not very different 
across ownership types.  The paper examines these possibilities empirically below. 
3.  Econometric Framework 
This paper follows the broader literature on the effects of privatization in estimating 
reduced form equations for firm performance, while trying to account for potential problems of 
unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity bias (Djankov and Murrell, 2002; Megginson and 
Netter, 2001).  Brown et al. (2006) report that results are very similar for a wide variety of 
production function specifications, so this paper limits attention to a simple Cobb-Douglas 
specification.  Also following Brown et al. (2006), technology parameters are permitted to vary 
across industries, a full set of industry-year effects is included to control for time-varying 
industry characteristics and shocks that may be correlated with both ownership and productivity, 
and potential selection bias is addressed using the longitudinal structure of the data to estimate 
alternative models based on different identifying assumptions. 
The simplest model assumes no selection into ownership type (private versus state in one 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Stiglitz (1999); Black, Kraakman, and Tarassova (2000); Kornai (2000); and Roland (2001).  Proponents 
of such programs include Lipton and Sachs (1990), Blanchard et al. (1993), Frydman and Rapaczynski (1994), and 
Boycko, Shleifer, and Vishny (1994, 1995).  
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specification, domestic private versus foreign versus state in the other) based on either the level 
or growth of productivity.  This model is estimated by applying ordinary least squares (OLS) to 
the production function augmented with ownership variables.  The second model assumes no 
selection based on productivity growth, adding firm fixed effects (FE) to the equation.  The third 
model permits each firm to have its own intrinsic growth rate by adding not only FE but also 
firm-specific time trends (FT); the identifying assumption is that the data-generating process for 
ownership is independent of productivity once all the other variables, including the FE and FT, 
are taken into account.  These alternative models are evaluated based on the extent to which they 
generate similar pre-privatization productivity behavior in firms of different ownership types. 
The estimating equation takes the following general form: 
 yijt = fj(kijt,lijt) + Djtγjt + wtαi  + θitδ + uijt, (1) 
where i indexes firms from 1 to N, j indexes industries from 1 to J, and t indexes time periods 
(years) from 1989 to 2005.  yijt is ln(output), fj is a 1 x J vector of industry-specific Cobb-
Douglas production functions, kijt is ln(capital stock), lijt is ln(employment), Djt is a vector of 
industry-year interaction dummies, γjt is the associated vector of coefficients, and uit is an 
idiosyncratic error.  The specifications of the other terms in the equation vary across 
specifications:  wt  is a vector of aggregate time variables, αi is the vector of associated 
individual-specific slopes, θit is the vector of ownership measures, and δ are the ownership 
effects of interest in this paper. 
The inclusion of a full set of unrestricted industry-year interactions, the Djt, permits 
different productivity levels for each industry in each year, controlling for any year- and 
industry-varying factors, such as price changes not captured by deflators, unmeasured factors of 
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production, and quality differences that are year-and industry-specific. 4   The methods of 
controlling for selection bias are embodied in the specification of wt.  The OLS model assumes 
wt ≡ 0.  The FE model specifies wt ≡ 1, so that αi ≡ αi is the unobserved effect.  Any fixed 
differences in productivity across firms are removed in the FE model.  The FE&FT model with 
firm-specific trends specifies wt ≡ (1, t), so that αi ≡ (α1i, α2i), where α1i is a fixed unobserved 
effect and α2i is the random trend for firm i.  In practice, the FE&FT model is estimated in two 
steps, the first detrending all variables for each firm separately and the second estimating the 
model on the detrended data.  Standard errors in the second step are adjusted for the loss of 
degrees of freedom associated with detrending. 
The ownership variables θit are specified to take into account both the nationality of new 
private owners in majority private companies and the dynamics of the privatization effect before 
and after privatization takes place.  The motivation for distinguishing foreign from domestic 
ownership is clearly that they may have different consequences for firm performance (a common 
finding in the literature; see Brown et al., 2006), while that for studying dynamics is threefold:  
First, estimating pre-privatization dynamics provides information on whether firms were already 
improving productivity prior to the ownership change.  Such behavior could be the result of 
some dynamic selection bias that the model does not account for, and we use the estimated 
effects of privatization in the period of 4 to 2 years before the privatization year to evaluate the 
magnitude of selection bias.  Second, estimating dynamics just before the privatization year 
permits an assessment of changes in incentives in anticipation of privatization; such anticipatory 
effects could be positive if they reflect career concerns of managers hoping either to show new 
owners their skills or to acquire their companies themselves, or they could be negative if the 
                                                 
4 J = 10 industries, chosen based on the trade-off between disaggregation and number of observations. 
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expectation of post-privatization loss of control—or of job—leads to increased asset-stripping 
(Aghion, Blanchard, and Burgess, 1994; Roland and Sekkat, 2000).  Privatization may be such a 
disruptive process that any firm suffers a short-run decline in productivity.5   Finally, examining 
post-privatization dynamics is useful for ascertaining the speed with which any estimated effect 
occurs:  is the effect immediate or gradual, becoming significant only with a long lag?  Does it 
tend to be a single jump in productivity, or is it more sustained, with a series of increases over 
several years?  Is it only temporary, as state firms tend to catch up, or does the effect appear to be 
permanent?   
The dynamic specification is implemented by interacting dummy variables for the years 
before and after privatization with domestic and foreign indicators.  Designating τ as the index of 
event time (the number of years since privatization) so that τ < 0 in the pre-privatization years, τ 
= 0 in the year in which ownership change occurs, and τ > 0 in the post-privatization years, then 
θit ≡ (Domesticitτ, Foreignitτ) and δ ≡ (δτd, δτf).  Privatization is assumed to have no effect until 
five years before the ownership change appears in our data, so that δτd = δτf  = 0 for τ ≤ -5.  We 
permit the effects to vary by year through τ = 7 for domestic and τ = 4 for foreign, based on the 
small sample sizes available for estimating separate effects for firms privatized many years 
before; subsequent years are pooled together.  The estimated vector of parameters δτd 
corresponds to the vector of variables Domesticitτ for τ = -4, -3…0…7+, where 7+ represents 
event-time at least 7 years after privatization to domestic investors.  Similarly, the model 
estimates δτf corresponding to Foreignitτ for τ = -4, -3…0…4+, where 4+ represents event-time 
at least 5 years after privatization to foreign investors. 
A second specification of the ownership variables permits the effects to vary in calendar 
                                                 
5 The dynamics just before the privatization year may show effects analogous to “Ashenfelter’s dip” in training 
evaluations—where workers about to enroll in a training program experience a drop in earnings. 
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time rather than event time.  In this case, Domesticitτ represents indicators distinguishing 
domestic ownership effects over years τ = 1997, 1998...2005.  Because of the much smaller 
sample of foreign ownership in earlier years, Foreignitτ represents indicators distinguishing 
foreign effects over years τ = 2000, 2001...2005.  
4.  Results 
Table 3 contains regression results for the event-time model described above, with the 
coefficients plotted in Figures 1a (for domestic private ownership) and 1b (for foreign 
ownership).  The results for domestic privatization show a declining relative trend prior to the 
privatization year (“year 0”) that is particularly pronounced in the FE specification but 
considerably lower in OLS and still more so in FE&FT.  Despite these differences, neither the 
FE nor the FE&FT specifications show much change immediately before the privatization year, 
implying that these may not be anticipatory effects, and all three specifications show a very 
similar evolution from the privatization year onwards.  Taking that year as the base, the 
specifications all imply an immediate positive but small effect of privatization in the first year of 
about 0.02, followed by accelerating increases for several years and then smaller increases after 
about –five to six years.  The cumulative effect for seven and more years after privatization is 
almost exactly the same in all three specifications at 0.25. 
The dynamics of the estimated foreign effect are rather different, implying positive 
selection of firms into this ownership type, which is quite large under OLS but attenuated by FE 
and still more so by FE&FT.  The FE&FT specification shows a significant jump in the 
privatization year, which could result from anticipatory effects, or possibly from the ambiguity 
of measuring precise privatization date (aggravated by a small sample).  Relative to the 
privatization year, the estimates are much less consistent than the domestic, the OLS and FE 
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specifications implying large cumulative effects 4 years and more after privatization of about 
0.50, while the FE&FT implies only about 0.10.  On the other hand, if the year before 
privatization is taken as the base, then the FE&FT effect is about 0.25.  Because the time period 
available for studying the foreign-owned firms is shorter, it would not be sensible to disaggregate 
the effects further out.  The small number of firms privatized to foreigners (157, as discussed 
above) also implies caution in interpreting these results.  Yet the data are quite consistent in 
implying that both types of privatization have substantial positive effects on productivity in 
Ukraine. 
Estimation results concerning the analysis of the variation in estimated privatization 
effects by calendar year are presented in Table 4, with coefficients plotted in Figures 2a and 2b.  
As discussed previously, the very small foreign samples in the early years preclude estimation of 
foreign effects before 2000, and even afterwards these estimates are likely to be noisy:  note the 
much larger standard errors on the foreign than on the domestic coefficients in all years.  The 
domestic effects show a steadily rising pattern under both FE and FE&FT, particularly for the 
latter, so that the estimated domestic effect in 2005 is 0.394 for FE&FT and 0.223 for FE.  The 
estimated foreign effects are more wobbly but are fairly consistent in 2005, implying a 0.50 
effect for that year. 
5.   Conclusion 
The results in this paper provide evidence of a strong contribution of privatization to 
aggregate manufacturing productivity growth in Ukraine during the transition period.  While the 
possibility of selection bias in estimating the effects of privatization is an important concern in 
privatization studies, this paper has exploited unusually extensive data that comprehensively 
cover manufacturing firms for a long period of time before and after privatization and that 
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include the state-owned comparison group.  The paper employs panel data techniques that are 
commonly used in the evaluation of labor market programs and that permit evaluations of some 
important forms of potential selection bias. 
The estimation results imply a substantial positive effect of privatization on productivity 
in enterprises privatized to domestic owners, which comprise well over 90 percent of all 
privatizations.  While results differ in some details across specifications, in particular for what 
they imply about behavior during the pre-privatization period, they are remarkably consistent in 
implying a steadily widening advantage of privatized firms relative to state-owned enterprises.  
By six to seven years after privatization, the productivity gap has widened to about 25 percent.  
The foreign results are based on a much smaller sample, which creates sampling variability in the 
estimates, but they too show clear evidence of positive, statistically significant effects.  The point 
estimates vary depending on the base period and the precise specification, but for recent years 
(2004 and 2005), the estimated foreign effects lie between 40 and 60 percent. 
Many questions and criticisms were raised about the nature of the privatization policies in 
Ukraine, especially in the early to mid-1990s before there was any significant foreign 
investment.  The immediate results of these policies were dispersed ownership structures 
dominated by insiders (both managers and workers), and few observers expected that well-
functioning corporate governance leading to productive restructuring would be the consequence.  
Indeed, the results in this paper suggest that improved productivity in privatized firms did 
emerge more slowly than in some well-documented Central European cases, such as Hungary 
and Romania (Brown et al., 2006).  Although it cannot be demonstrated from available data, the 
insider-owners may have been slow to learn about effective ways to restructure, and ownership 
concentration may have taken time to develop.  Yet what is clear from the data is that the 
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privatized firms in Ukraine have steadily widened their productivity gap over state-owned 
enterprises, so that after several years the productivity effect of privatization in Ukraine is 
actually quite similar to those of its Central European counterparts.  These results provide 
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Table 1:  Summary Statistics 
 
 1989 1999 2005 
Output 24,575 6,568 8,952 
 (73,542) (35,430) (55,180) 
Employment 881 427 325 
 (1,993) (1,249) (1,838) 
Capital 17,456 13,346 18,985 
 (74,105) (98,192) (161,409) 
N 3,216 4,330 4,247 
Note:  These are means by year for each variable, with standard deviations in 
parentheses.  Output equals value of gross output in thousands of 1989 rubles; 
capital equals average book value of fixed assets used in the main activity of the 
enterprise, adjusted for revaluations, and again in 1989 rubles; employment 
equals the average number of registered industrial production personnel, which 
includes non-production workers, but excludes “nonindustrial” employees who 




Table 2:  Evolution of Domestic Private and Foreign Ownership 








 Domestic Foreign 
1989 0.000 0.000 
1992 0.000 0.000 
1993 0.000 0.000 
1994 0.001 0.000 
1995 0.110 0.001 
1996 0.231 0.001 
1997 0.354 0.002 
1998 0.561 0.006 
1999 0.646 0.006 
2000 0.724 0.008 
2001 0.739 0.008 
2002 0.703 0.010 
2003 0.720 0.017 
2004 0.714 0.022 




Table 3:  Estimated Dynamics of Privatization Effects Around Privatization Year 
 
Domestic  Foreign Years  
before/after 
Privatization OLS FE FE&FT OLS FE FE&FT 
-4 -0.014 -0.108 -0.036 0.495 0.271 0.150 
 (0.021) (0.018) (0.015) (0.109) (0.080) (0.079) 
-3 -0.010 -0.106 -0.029 0.540 0.321 0.175 
 (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.105) (0.089) (0.098) 
-2 -0.024 -0.109 -0.022 0.550 0.314 0.180 
 (0.023) (0.027) (0.028) (0.102) (0.095) (0.123) 
-1 -0.058 -0.139 -0.036 0.466 0.315 0.203 
 (0.026) (0.032) (0.036) (0.112) (0.105) (0.149) 
 0 -0.087 -0.154 -0.025 0.547 0.417 0.345 
 (0.029) (0.037) (0.044) (0.115) (0.113) (0.172) 
 1 -0.078 -0.140 -0.000 0.524 0.463 0.406 
 (0.032) (0.042) (0.053) (0.107) (0.116) (0.195) 
 2 -0.036 -0.111 0.042 0.701 0.590 0.471 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.061) (0.111) (0.119) (0.220) 
 3 0.019 -0.063 0.095 0.671 0.569 0.414 
 (0.037) (0.050) (0.071) (0.109) (0.123) (0.234) 
 4 0.096 0.001 0.156 1.042 0.921 0.440 
 (0.040) (0.053) (0.079) (0.246) (0.253) (0.258) 
 5 0.127 0.038 0.206    
 (0.043) (0.057) (0.088)    
 6 0.152 0.078 0.243    
 (0.046) (0.060) (0.095)    
 7+ 0.155 0.086 0.272    
 (0.053) (0.066) (0.104)    
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  “4” is four and more years after privatization for the 
foreign effect.  “7+” signifies seven and more years after privatization for the domestic effect.  R2 = 0.767 for 
OLS and within R2 = 0.662 for FE and 0.369 for FE&FT.  Observations = 62,899. 
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Table 4:  Estimated Effects of Privatization by Calendar Year 
 
Domestic  Foreign Calendar  
Year FE FE&FT FE FE&FT 
1995 0.007 -0.004   
 (0.034) (0.027)   
1996 -0.023 -0.009   
 (0.028) (0.024)   
1997 -0.007 -0.010   
 (0.025) (0.023)   
1998 0.021 0.030   
 (0.026) (0.024)   
1999 0.021 0.041   
 (0.032) (0.030)   
2000 0.026 0.063 0.598 0.378 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.137) (0.127) 
2001 0.042 0.098 0.446 0.141 
 (0.040) (0.033) (0.170) (0.098) 
2002 0.136 0.221 0.366 0.196 
 (0.044) (0.038) (0.173) (0.106) 
2003 0.175 0.283 0.483 0.274 
 (0.048) (0.046) (0.133) (0.107) 
2004 0.179 0.299 0.599 0.386 
 (0.051) (0.054) (0.115) (0.119) 
2005 0.223 0.394 0.534 0.465 
 (0.053) (0.064) (0.111) (0.126) 
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses.  There are insufficient foreign privatizations prior to 
2000 to obtain reliable estimates in those years.  Within R2 = 0.660 for FE and 0.369 for FE&FT.  
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